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This paper analyzes institutional and legal changes related to corporate governance
and their impact on financial performance in Japan since the second half of the
1990s. We attempt to address two issues systematically: (1) how much the
governance reforms of Japanese firms transformed the conventional system of
alliance capitalism and managerial control; and (2) what economic outcomes those
governance changes have yielded. As the Commercial Code and other legal and
institutional frameworks were revised, Japanese firms experienced shifts in terms of
stock ownership, corporate control and managerial organizations. Our empirical
results show that the influence of new ownership composition and reformed
governance mechanisms on financial performance remains varied. We find that
certain factors, such as foreign and financial investors, functioned positively, while
others, like the executive officer system and stock options, had little or negative
performance effect. Japanese management apparently appeased market investor
pressure by superficially institutionalizing various governance reforms, while
enhancing financial performance through strategic modifications.
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Introduction
Previous studies on Japanese corporate governance have largely attempted to
address universal issues of agency relationships in the Japanese context, in
which some institution-specific factors such as bank monitoring and keiretsu
affiliation play an important role. However, the corporate governance model
and practices based on such mechanisms have been facing rising pressures from
multiple sources since the early 1990s. Indeed, there have been substantial
changes in several aspects of corporate governance in Japan. This paper
analyzes institutional and legal changes regarding corporate governance in
Japan and their impact on financial performance since the second half of the
1990s.
There were two major triggers, one domestic and the other international,
that can account for such changes. First, the collapse of the bubble economy in
the early 1990s forced many Japanese firms and the government to reexamine
conventional business practices. Owing to the prolonged recession into the
2000s, Japanese corporate executives and business scholars appear to have lost
confidence in the Japanese-style management that they had collectively and
uncritically praised as the core mechanism of Japan’s long-term phenomenal
growth since the second half of the 1950s. Instead, some started to support the
‘global’ corporate governance model after the US standard, which emphasizes
market orientation and shareholder value.
Second, since the 1980s the liberalization of financial and capital markets,
besides privatization and deregulation of economic activities, became focal
issues globally. Between the US and Japan, in particular, one of the most
contentious issues was the current account imbalance between them, which did
not improve despite the rising yen and the gradual opening of Japanese
markets to international trade and investment. Because of this, there had been
economic and political pressure from US businesses and the government. The
US government also focused on various legal, regulatory and structural issues
that were claimed to hinder the success of US businesses and investments in
Japan. It was argued that altering Japanese governance towards the US model
would make it easier for American firms to penetrate Japanese product and
capital markets.
These two elements pursuing governance reforms merged into a single strong
tide to bring about major legal and institutional changes, leading to formal and
informal pressures on Japanese firms and their management to reform
corporate governance practices. Such alterations include adjustments in
corporate financing; reexamination of group relations; reforms in boardroom
practices, such as the implementation of the executive officer system; and
modifications in executive compensation, including the introduction of stock
option plans. In addition to these, we have witnessed significant shifts in the
Asli M. Colpan et al.
Japanese Corporate Governance
S90
Asian Business & Management 2007 6
shareholder composition of Japanese firms, which is caused by changing
macro-economic and global environments (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001;
Miyajima and Aoki, 2002; Shimotani, 2006; Yoshikawa and McGuire, 2007).
Although numerous governance reform measures have been introduced
since the 1990s, we still know little about their effect on the inner functioning
and ultimate financial outcome of Japanese firms. According to agency theory,
ownership by arms-length ‘market’ investors demanding shareholder-oriented
practices and seeking financial returns should narrow the agency gap, and
therefore management is pressured and motivated to improve firm profitability
rather than target other goals, in order to satisfy its own and other
stakeholders’ interests. However, from an institutional theory perspective,
while a firm, as long as it is a publicly-held one, cannot determine its own
shareholder composition (although it may influence, eg by asking affiliated
firms to acquire its stocks), it may be motivated to adopt new governance
measures only superficially to appease external pressures (eg from arms-length
investors) and decouple the actual practices, especially if legitimacy, both
functional and social, of those institutionalized measures has not been firmly
established (Oliver, 1991). In other words, a firm may adopt new governance
practices as a strategic or tactical response to external market pressures, yet
only symbolically (Fiss and Zajac, 2004). In this case, the adoption of new
governance practices may have limited effects on firm performance, although
ownership preference may still remain as a factor influencing financial
outcomes.
These two different perspectives, agency framework and institutional theory,
will present contrasting implications on the effectiveness of specific corporate
governance mechanisms. By employing econometric analyses, the second half
of this article aims to pin down the performance implications of those several
governance and managerial changes on firm performance and test the
applicability of agency and institutional theories in the Japanese context. We
will focus on shareholder composition and main bank affiliation as an external
mechanism and the size and functioning of the board of directors and executive
compensation as internal mechanisms of corporate governance.
Theory
Agency theory
Agency theory attempts to deal with problems arising in bilateral relationships
when the goals of principal and agent conflict, and when it is difficult and/or
expensive for the principal to monitor and verify the agent’s actions. According
to Eisenhardt (1989), the large modern corporation, wherein professional
senior managers operate the firm as the agent for a large group of shareholders,
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represents a classic situation in which the agency problem arises. The theory
posits a number of ownership conditions and monitoring mechanisms that
attenuate the agency problem between shareholders and managers. These
include shareholding by block owners or institutional investors, the external
managerial labor market, performance-based managerial compensation, the
presence of outside independent members on the board and the market for
corporate control (Fama, 1980; Jensen, 1986). The theory predicts that these
mechanisms can solve or mitigate the agency problem by narrowing the
divergence of interest between shareholders and management.
In the Japanese context, however, previous studies have focused on the role
of context-specific mechanisms such as main bank relationships and keiretsu
affiliations. This is understandable, as the Japanese governance mechanism
apparently functioned well up to the 1980s, while Japanese firms exhibited
several significant features such as dispersed ownership, silent shareholders,
and managerial control that large US firms historically demonstrated.
Research was then concentrated on the specific Japanese instruments that
worked for performance improvement, because US firms, especially in the
1980s, visibly suffered from ineffective strategic decision-making by insider
senior management.
As the financial performance of Japanese firms declined markedly from the
early 1990s, they began to implement some of the internal mechanisms used in
US firms, such as performance-based and incentive-ridden managerial
compensation, including stock options and more effective board monitoring
by shareholders. Further, their ownership structure changed to include more
performance-oriented market investors. These changes give us an opportunity
to apply the research models used in the US context and test them in the
Japanese environment. If Japanese corporate governance is converging toward
the US model, then the theory predicts that the agency problem can be
mitigated by these changes, and therefore firm performance should improve to
benefit the interests of shareholders.
Institutional theory
Institutional theory posits that firms attempt to incorporate norms in their
institutional environments so that they can gain legitimacy, resources, stability
and enhanced survival prospects (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and
Powell, 1983). In other words, firms act to enhance their legitimacy in the
environment in which they operate, implying that they will implement new
measures when it seems appropriate. Hence, if the social legitimacy (and
economic rationality) of new measures is yet to be firmly established, firms
tend to resist adopting them, as they will not gain much from the adoption
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(Oliver, 1991). This is especially true if new measures are vastly inconsistent
with existing organizational practices.
However, when firms face strong external pressures to implement new
measures, especially from an important constituent who provides key resources
such as capital, they may adopt them only partially, or adopt them, but decouple
them from actual practice, to simultaneously appease the key constituent and
maintain internal organizational stability. This argument is also consistent with
resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Therefore, firms may
be seemingly complying with external pressures by implementing new measures,
but are actually concealing non-conformity (Oliver, 1991; Westphal and Zajac,
2001). This suggests that the internal measures that a firm implements represent
strategic and tactical options available within the institutional constraints, and
that the performance implications of such measures are often uncertain because
firms may choose to decouple them.
This argument, however, only applies to an extent to ownership structure.
Facing the rise of investors seeking financial returns, a firm may be able to
mitigate their pressure by asking affiliated firms or close business partners to
own its shares. However, a firm cannot completely block the capital market
pressure exerted by market-oriented investors, because as long as the firm is
publicly listed it does not have complete control over its ownership structure.
This means that although a firm facing capital market pressure through
changing ownership composition has strategic choices as to how to respond to
such pressures (some of them merely symbolic), it cannot block them. This
implies that ownership structure may directly or indirectly have stronger
performance implications than the internal practices over which a firm has
control. Therefore, we have two different perspectives on the performance
implications of the adoption of new internal corporate governance measures.
The next section discusses the major changes in Japanese corporate governance
since the 1990s.
Paradigm Shift in Japanese Corporate Governance
The post-World War II corporate governance of Japanese firms has ultimately
adopted a relationship-centered model based on the combination of stable
institutional ownership, main bank debt financing, professional managerial
control and keiretsu transactions. This relational pattern has begun to change
since the 1990s due to the above-mentioned conditions: prolonged slump in
Japanese business; and international economic pressure, mainly from US
interests (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001; Miyajima and Aoki, 2002; Shimotani,
2006). The macroeconomic recession led to deteriorating corporate
performance and thus declining dividends and share prices. Some investors
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and observers blamed Japan’s inadequate corporate governance system for the
significant drop in share prices (Watanabe and Yamamoto, 1992). Because of
rising public and international expectations on Japanese firms to deal with the
governance issue for higher profitability, Japanese firms started to pay greater
attention to their corporate governance practices. The traditional stable
investors, especially commercial banks, started to pay more attention to the
performance of their invested firms, as they themselves were also facing
financial troubles due to the large amount of non-performing loans. Foreign
and domestic arms-length investors seeking capital and income gains buying
shares sold by stable investors imposed further pressure on corporate
governance practices and ultimately financial performance.
The pressure to place more focus on shareholders’ interests and firm
profitability ultimately implied a shift for Japanese firms from relationship-
based, stakeholder-centered governance towards a market-based and share-
holder-oriented model. When a firm tries to accommodate various stakeholders’
interests that may be in conflict, it may have to choose sub-optimal allocation of
resources and hence sacrifice firm profitability. The business relationship-
oriented stable investors did not aim at maximizing the investment return on
their shareholdings; as such they did not impose much pressure on senior
managers to improve firm performance (Kester, 1991; Charkham, 1994). How-
ever, because of the changes in stable shareholders’ interests on the one hand,
and the ownership structure towards increasing foreign and market investors on
the other, a move toward a market-based shareholder-oriented model of
corporate governance became inevitable in Japanese firms (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1 Structural change in Japanese corporate governance.
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In reaction to those environmental pressures, we have seen major legal
reforms introduced by the government and institutional changes in corporate
governance practices. Below we analyze the resulting four major changes in
ownership and management in detail.
Organizational Changes in Shareholder Composition
The ownership of large Japanese firms has long been dominated by domestic
financial institutions and non-financial firms. These holdings often reflect long-
standing business relationships with partners, their ‘stable’ shareholders.
Relations among such stable shareholders are sometimes characterized by
reciprocal holdings, seen as an expression of goodwill (Clark, 1979), and help
cement transactional and historical ties (Gerlach, 1992). Because of this
feature, the emphasis on the maximization of shareholder interests has been
less applicable to these domestic shareholdings (Sheard, 1994; Phan and
Yoshikawa, 2000).
However, changes in capital markets and accounting rules have exerted
pressure towards change. The prolonged Japanese economic downturn has
impacted deeply on traditional stable shareholdings (Shimotani, 2006). As
many Japanese firms needed to avoid reporting losses from their share-
holdings, especially during their performance decline after the new accounting
rules (implemented in 1996 to make Japanese rules closer to international
accounting standards), they started to reduce shareholdings in affiliated firms.
Further, they were put under increasing pressure to pay greater attention to the
operational efficiency of their employed capital, due to rising capital market
pressures. Consequently, the proportion of stable shareholdings and reciprocal
holdings has declined significantly over the past decade. According to data
from the NLI Research Institute (2004), stable shareholdings have dropped
from 45 to 24 per cent, and reciprocal holdings declined from 18 to 7 per cent
between 1990 and 2003 (see Table 1).
Many shares sold by these stable relationship-oriented investors have been
acquired by foreign and domestic market-oriented investors, especially trust
banks. Domestic pension funds as well as investment trusts have also been
gaining prominence in Japanese capital markets since the 1990s (Fukao, 1999;
Inoue, 1999). Although they are not quite arms-length players, these investors
are more performance-oriented and seek higher returns on their equity
holdings (Suto and Toshino, 2005). On the other hand, globalization of stock
investment by international institutional investors, especially from the US and
Europe, and relatively low post-bubble Japanese stock prices led foreign
portfolio investors to increase their holdings of Japanese stocks steadily
from the 1990s (Miyajima and Kuroki, 2007): Foreign ownership of Japanese
firms rose from 4 per cent in 1990 to 22 per cent of all listed Japanese shares in
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2004 (Kabushiki Bunpu Chosa, 2004). As many of these foreign investors have
only arms-length relationships with the firms in which they invest, they look for
higher investment returns based on more shareholder-oriented corporate
governance models (Yoshikawa and Phan, 2001; Jackson and Moerke, 2005).
Figure 2 illustrates the change in ownership of Japanese firms since 1970,
representing the long-term and short-run trends described above.
These changes in ownership structure suggest that Japanese firms are under
greater pressure to accommodate the needs of return-oriented investors such as
foreign portfolio investors and domestic trust banks. As these investors’
relationships with firms in which they own shares are only performance-based,
they look for higher investment returns. Further, foreign investors are more
likely to demand that Japanese firms disclose corporate information, as they do
not have other means to gather such information, unlike stable domestic
shareholders (Yoshikawa and Linton, 2000). This means that internationally
active institutional investors may pressure Japanese firms to adopt global
standards of corporate disclosure (Useem, 1998). Hence, those Japanese firms
with large foreign ownership may have to place greater focus on market
shareholders’ interests.
One consequence of these changes in shareholder composition and
managerial principles is the rise of executive shareholding among Japanese
firms. Following the theoretical argument of agency theory, the share
ownership of the firm executives manage is assumed to be instrumental in
Table 1 Stable and cross shareholdings
Stable shareholdings (%) Cross-shareholdings (%)
1990 45.60 18.10
1991 45.60 17.90
1992 45.70 17.80
1993 45.20 17.60
1994 44.90 17.40
1995 43.40 17.10
1996 42.20 16.30
1997 40.50 15.10
1998 39.90 13.30
1999 38.00 10.90
2000 33.10 10.40
2001 30.20 9.00
2002 27.20 7.90
2003 24.30 7.60
Source: Kabushiki Mochiai Bunpu Chosa 2003, NLI Research Institute; Kabushiki Bunpu Chosa
(2004), Association of Stock Exchanges.
Note: Percentage of bank shareholdings includes cross-shareholdings. Percentage of stable
shareholdings includes cross-shareholdings.
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aligning their interest with that of other shareholders. In other words, senior
managers with shareholdings are assumed to aim to maximize the shareholder
value, rather than the size and sales, of the firm they manage, because that
value directly affects their own financial status. This is, therefore, another trend
that may lead Japanese managers to be more returns-oriented.
Organizational Changes in Corporate Financing and Group Relations
Corporate finance practices among Japanese firms after World War II
illustrated two structural characteristics: the predominance of debt financing,
and intra-group reciprocal shareholding and mutual control. After the war,
most Japanese firms were cash-starved due to hyperinflation and direct
wartime damage to facilities. Demand for large-scale investment was pressing,
while capital markets remained marginal in size and speculative in nature. The
organizational mechanism within these economic constraints was keiretsu
financing, in which commercial banks, particularly large ones (toshi ginko), or
city banks selected their customers for long-term financial ties. The resulting
keiretsu yushi, or relational lending, became popular as the Japanese economy
experienced rapid growth from the mid-1950s. The bank acting as the ‘main
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bank’ repeatedly rolled over loans to their customers, and the consequential
relationships became maintained as a stable source of long-term loans until the
1980s (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001; Shimotani, 2006).
The relational lending functioned as a monitoring instrument as well as
financing mechanism. Given the relative shortage of loanable money and the
abundance of investment demand, banks first scrutinized and screened loan
applications coming from keiretsu firms for the feasibility of investment
schemes. Once they decided on and committed to funding particular schemes,
the banks were forced to monitor the investments, a protective mechanism on
the part of the bank to avoid non-performing loans. On the borrower’s side,
such bank supervision worked as a monitoring device through which the
effective functioning of project execution could be assured (Aoki, 2004).
The commercial banks and industrial companies in post-war Japan
generated one more organizational and operational structure unique to that
economy: kigyo shudan, or the corporate group. Often confused with the yushi
keiretsu, kigyo shudan illustrated different principles in terms of ownership and
control. In addition to a mechanism of debt financing organized by the core
commercial bank within the group, kigyo shudan functioned primarily as an
apparatus of equity ownership and transaction domains. Commercial banks
most often at the core of the kigyo shudan maintained debt financing
relationships with constituent group firms, but the banks also owned a small
percentage of their shares. Furthermore, within each group member firms
mutually owned a small fraction of the share of other firms, which resulted in
‘mutual ownership and mutual control’ (Okumura, 2000).
These two organization types, yushi keiretsu and kigyo shudan, gradually
became insignificant, especially in the 1980s, as the long-term success of those
group forms made constituent firms more independent of associations. The
firms accumulated enough internal reserve to finance their own investment
schemes, while commercial banks found themselves with abundant cash that
could be loaned out to whatever opportunities the banks could find, inside or
beyond main bank relationships (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001).
In the recession decade of the 1990s, many of those banks became saddled
with non-performing loans, resulting from the expansive lending sprees of the
late 1980s, and were faced with the need to restructure their loan portfolio.
However, it is argued that the prolonged recession of the 1990s was partly due to
the banks’ lax loan restructurings, in which they kept lending to insolvent firms
(Caballero et al., 2006). This practice was especially visible between the main
banks and yushi keiretsu firms. Nevertheless, many banks eventually reorganized
their main relationships for the sake of their financial health. While the banks
became more market- and performance-oriented, Japanese firms gradually
moved from debt financing towards equity financing. Kigyo shudan also became
a constraint on the further growth of constituent firms, rather than a mechanism
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for stable development, as individual firms could not exploit significant entry
opportunities without invading the business domains of other members. In a
sense, individual member firms had outgrown the entire group (Miyajima and
Arikawa, 2001; Shimotani, 2006).
Managerial changes in the boardroom and executive officer system
When Sony announced changes in its management organization towards
shikko yakuin sei (executive or operating officer system) in 1997, business
journalism welcomed the move as an innovation towards an efficient and
effective system after US governance models. After all, Japan’s economy was
still suffering from negative growth and nagging deflation, while Sony then
remained a bright success story in global markets (Shimotani, 2006). The
executive officer system was supposed to solve a classic dilemma of modern
corporate management: how to differentiate and divide the distinctive
management roles of supervisory control and operational implementation.
Sony came up with a management organization separating off implementation
to shikko yakuin (executive or operating officers) from the board of directors,
whose size was shrunk for the sake of effective decision-making. Hence,
the board concentrated on fundamental decision-making and the supervision
of the strategic implementation by executive officers. This separation of
control and supervision from implementation was supposedly modelled after
the system adopted by US firms. Within a widespread consensus towards
shareholder orientation of US corporate management, combined with the lost
confidence in Japanese governance practices and Sony’s innovative reputation,
it was not surprising that many other Japanese firms followed suit (see Table 2).
While Sony’s move remained voluntary and internal without any broad legal
foundations, their system encouraged the reform of the Commercial Code in
the spring of 2002. That change institutionalized the executive officer system
under the name of shikko yakuin. Indeed, the 2002 revision of the Commercial
Code offered individual firms two fundamental choices in terms of governance.
Newly introduced was a US-style committee system in which the board
Table 2 Number of firms implementing the executive officer system
Year No. of firms No. of firms implementing EOS Ratio (%)
1997 NA 1 (Sony) NA
1998 1,137 40 3.50
2000 1,310 279 21.30
2002 1,363 466 34.20
2005 1,317 649 49.30
Source: Tokyo stock exchange.
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establishes three committees — supervisory, nominating and compensation —
that are supposed to monitor the functioning of executive or operating officers.
Firms adopting this model are not required to maintain statutory auditors,
because this function is now supposed to be carried out by the supervisory
committee.
While the executive officer system as a business practice became popular, the
diffusion of the legally backed committee system, in which the operational
officer system is integrated, is yet limited. This discrepancy stems partially from
the fact that the separation of supervision and management remains fuzzy, as
some top executives fill a dual role of board member and representative
executive officer — a mechanism of self-monitoring in which a single individual
plays the role of a monitor and monitored. This is a structural issue still hotly
debated even in the US, but given the weakness of shareholder pressure in
Japan, the new organization has become simply symbolic, as institutional theory
suggests, and may actually strengthen the dominance of insider management.
Structural changes in executive compensation and stock options
One of the most significant corporate governance reforms concerning executive
compensation in Japan has been the introduction of stock options and the
transition of executives’ salary to a performance-based system. Both systems
have been introduced to promote stockholder-conscious management by
strengthening the link between executive compensation and firm performance.
The amendment of the Commercial Code in 1997 opened the way for the
full-scale introduction of stock options, which is one of the methods that aim
to establish efficient corporate governance by encouraging managers to
conduct business in accordance with shareholders’ interests. The Commercial
Code originally allowed the granting of stock options only to a firm’s own
management and employees, but was revised to include all stakeholders in
2002. There was also a limit on how many shares could be allotted in stock
options and terms were restricted to a time period of 10 years, but these
restrictions were removed by a 2001 amendment of the Commercial Code and
more than a third of publicly traded companies had introduced the system by
the end of 2004 (Tanaka, 2005).
According to Tanaka, Japanese firms adopting stock option plans after 1997
allotted on average 2.03 per cent of the number of stocks issued (approximately
506,000). The average number of people receiving stock options was 190 per
firm and the average allocation was 2,346 per person. Those eligible for
stock options are now not limited to directors or officers. In fact, in more
than 90 per cent of firms with such plans, employees are also eligible.
Moreover, younger firms have a stronger tendency to use stock options as a
part of their compensation plan for employees. The prior study also found that
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in Japanese firms where a substitute monitoring mechanism is in place, such as
a higher level of ownership by other firms, option plans are less likely to be
adopted (Kato et al., 2005). Nagaoka (2005) also found that stock option plans
are used more by fast-growing Japanese firms and less in regulated industries.
Executive salaries, on the other hand, have been traditionally determined by
setting limits to total salary amount in the statutes of a corporation or through
a resolution at a shareholders’ meeting, and then by ratifying the exact amount
for each executive in a board meeting. It has been pointed out that the
sensitivity of executive compensation to firm performance is rather low (Kubo,
2005). However, an amendment of the Commercial Code in 2002 enabled firms
to determine executives’ salary without setting limits on the total salary,
therefore enabling firms to closely link salary to performance. As a result, an
increasing number of firms are introducing performance-based executive salary
systems: as of 2006, 59 per cent of companies in the First and Second sections
of the Tokyo Stock Exchange had done so (Nomura Research Institute, 2007).
Table 3 shows average amounts of executive compensation, including salary
and bonus per director and statutory auditor, in the largest Japanese firms in
2004. The table shows that the average amount of a director’s salary and bonus
per year was 23.5 million and 5.8 million yen, respectively. For statutory
auditors, this number is smaller, with an average value of 12.1 million yen for
salary and 1.5 million yen for bonus. Manufacturing industries in total show
higher amounts of executive compensation in comparison to non-manufactur-
ing industries. Nevertheless, the high standard deviation for both salary and
bonus in the manufacturing industries implies a greater discrepancy among
firms in manufacturing industries compared to non-manufacturing industries.
The table also illustrates that as of 2004, 28.4 per cent of those large firms had
introduced stock option plans.
Effectiveness of corporate governance ‘reforms’
Although many Japanese firms have formally altered their corporate
governance mechanisms, the performance implications of individual govern-
ance factors are still unclear. Following the arguments on the changes in
corporate governance at managerial and organizational levels, we hypothesize
their effects on firm performance according to agency theory reasoning. We
focus on changes in shareholder composition and main bank affiliation as an
external factor and the size and functioning of the board of directors and the
structure of executive compensation as internal factors. We then compare the
results with institutional theory logic in the Discussion section. Table 4
summarizes the expected effectiveness of several governance variables.
The first three hypotheses relate to the effectiveness of key shareholders on
firm performance. We suggest positive effects in foreign ownership, executive
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ownership and financial ownership. As the main investment objective of
foreign investors is high investment returns, their increasing ratio in a firm will
result in higher financial outcomes. Executive ownership that aligns the
Table 3 Composition and compensation of executives in major Japanese firms in 2004
Variable All firms Manufacturing firms Non-manufacturing firms
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
No. of board members
Directors 14.8 7.5 14.5 7.0 15.3 8.2
(Outside directors) (0.7) (1.2) (0.6) (0.9) (0.8) (1.5)
Auditors 4.3 0.7 4.2 0.6 4.4 0.8
(Outside auditors) (2.4) (0.8) (2.3) (0.7) (2.5) (0.8)
Salary and bonus per person
Director’s salary
(in million yen)
23.5 20.3 25.5 25.4 20.8 9.2
Director’s bonus
(in million yen)
5.8 6.6 6.6 7.6 4.8 4.7
Auditor’s salary
(in million yen)
12.3 3.9 12.9 3.7 11.5 4.2
Auditor’s bonus
(in million yen)
1.5 2.0 1.7 2.3 1.1 1.5
Proportion of firms
introducing stock
options (%)
28.4 31.96 23.61
Notes:
1. Numbers of outside directors and outside auditors are included in the numbers of directors and
auditors, respectively.
2. Sources of data are as follows: For the number of executives, values in Yakuin Shikiho are
employed, except for numbers of outside directors and outside auditors, which have been compiled
from the financial statement report of each company. The average executive’s bonus per person has
been calculated by dividing the total of executives’ bonus, which appears in the section ‘Situation of
Corporate Governance’ of the financial statement report or the ‘Appropriation Statement’, by the
number of executives. The average executive’s salary per person was calculated by dividing the total
of executives’ salary in the section of ‘Situation of Corporate Governance’ of the financial
statement report by the number of executives. Nikkei Needs is employed for calculating the
proportion of firms introducing stock options.
3. The total amount of pay to executives is composed of salary, bonus, retirement benefit and
salary, and bonus paid as wage payment. However, few companies report them separately in
financial statement reports. In the above table, we thus compiled the data of the largest 500
companies in terms of consolidated sales, except for financial institutions, which had detailed data
in their financial reports, and contacted the investor relations departments of the others to clarify
the content of total amount of pay to executives described in their financial statement reports.
Values in this table have been calculated from the data of 154 companies (87 firms in the
manufacturing industry and 67 firms in non-manufacturing industry) from which we could obtain
the accurate value of the executives’ salary through the above procedure.
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interests of shareholders and executives will bring higher returns, as executives
will become more profitability-oriented. Financial shareholders are also
expected to have a positive impact on profitability, because, although there
is no prior evidence that bank monitoring is positively related to firm
performance, financial institutions since the late 1990s have become more
motivated to pressure client firms to place greater emphasis on profitability,
due to the banks’ own bad debt troubles. Further, trust banks that increasingly
have high proportions of firm shares from that period are performance-
oriented and seek higher returns on their equity investments.
Several studies to date have shown mixed results. While foreign ownership
was positively associated with firm performance in some studies (Nitta, 2000;
Sasaki and Yonezawa, 2000; Miyajima and Kuroki, 2005), others (Gedajlovic
et al., 2005) did not find any relationship between foreign ownership and
profitability in the 1990s. Gedajlovic and Shapiro (2002) found a positive
relationship for financial ownership, while Nitta found a negative relationship.
Sasaki and Yonezawa found a positive relationship between director owner-
ship and Tobin’s q, while Gedajlovic et al. (2005) found an insignificant
relationship between director ownership and firm profitability.1
Several studies examining the role of banks show that the main banks play a
monitoring role. Previous studies (cf. Sheard, 1994; Kang and Shivdasani, 1995)
showed the monitoring effects of yushi keiretsu affiliation, for example, in dis-
patching directors to, or by encouraging restructuring of, client firms experi-
encing performance decline. Nonetheless, all these studies use data from the
1970s and 1980s, when the main bank’s financial leverage was strong and
monitoring power was effective. Hence, we cannot conclude from these past
outcomes that main bank monitoring was still effective in the 1990s. Indeed,
there is some evidence that the main bank no longer plays an effective gover-
nance function (Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998; Morck and Yeung, 2006). Given the
declining role of yushi keiretsu linkage, we thus hypothesize here that affiliation
to a main bank has no significant effect on firm profitability (Hypothesis 4).
Table 4 Hypothesized relationships between governance factors and profitability from an agency
theory perspective
Expected results Profitability
H1. Foreign ownership +
H2. Executive ownership +
H3. Financial ownership +
H4. Yushi keiretsu membership Insignificant
H5. Board size 
H6. Executive officer system (presence) +
H7. Stock option (presence) +
Asli M. Colpan et al.
Japanese Corporate Governance
S103
Asian Business & Management 2007 6
Hypotheses 5 and 6 propose that boardroom reforms in terms of the
reduction of board size and introduction of an executive officer system should
improve firm performance because the objective of those changes was to
improve the quality of decision-making and the effectiveness of monitoring
(Yermack, 1996; Aoki, 2004). Some studies argue for the efficiency of small
boards in Japan (Miyajima and Nitta, 2006). Nevertheless, others suggest that
the recent boardroom reforms initiated by Japanese firms do not seem to have
any positive effects on firm performance (Yoshikawa and Phan, 2003; Aoki,
2004).
Firms initiate stock option plans to align the interests of shareholders and
managers, and the introduction of such systems ultimately should have a
positive impact on firm performance (Hypothesis 7). Kato et al. (2005) have
also pointed out that, in comparison to firms not adopting stock option plans,
return on assets (ROA) of the adopting firms is significantly higher than that of
non-adopting firms and these results are consistent with the view that option
plans improve performances in adopting firms.
The sample, variables and methodology
The sample includes all the electronics companies listed on the First section of
Japan’s three largest stock exchanges, Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya. The
electronics industry was chosen for three reasons: First, it represents one of the
most dynamic and successful industries in Japan. Second, electronics firms
include a wide spectrum of examples of ownership and governance from the
conventional mode of managerial dominance to firms owned and managed by
international investment funds. Third, electronics firms have been at the
forefront of several important shifts in corporate governance. By 2002, for
instance, the 69 listed electronics firms had adopted the executive officer
system, the most widespread among manufacturing industries. The electronics
industry has remained one of the most active sectors invested and traded by
international investors, with more than 30 per cent of corporate stocks in the
hands of foreign shareholders. Furthermore, our selection of one industry
allows us to remove industry-level effects. The time period of this study, 1997–
2003, encompasses the institutionalization of several measures of shareholder
orientation in Japan, starting with the introduction of stock options, the
establishment of the executive officer system and the legalization of pure
holding companies, all in 1997.
The majority of the statistical data was collected from Yuka Shoken
Hokokusho (Report on Securities and Stocks), that is the semiannual reports
that listed companies file with the Ministry of Finance, Nikkei Needs database
and Yakuin Shikiho (Board of Directors Quarterly Reports). Whenever any
substantial data were missing for particular firms, those firms were removed
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from the sample. Hence, our original sample of 146 was reduced to104 firms in
our final analysis.
This study employs ROA to illustrate company profitability. For governance
factors, we employ several variables. Foreign ownership is the proportion of
total shares held by foreign owners. This measure has been used reliably in past
studies (Ahmadjian and Robinson, 2001; Yoshikawa et al., 2005). Executive
ownership measures a proportion of total shares held by the members of the
board and statutory auditors. As the majority of Japanese board members are
insiders (ie senior executives), we treat this as executive ownership. By owning
shares in the firm they manage, it is theorized that executive ownership will
promote shareholder value on the part of executives. Financial ownership is the
proportion of total shares held by Japanese financial institutions, including
banks and insurance companies (Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 2002). They are
assumed to possess superior monitoring capabilities and higher incentives than
operating companies and individual investors.
In terms of corporate group relations, we only employ yushi keiretsu
affiliation in this study given its high correlation at 0.785 level with kigyo
shudan membership. Given the significant changes that all kigyo shudan
experienced at the beginning of the 2000s, yushi keiretsu will provide a more
consistent measure of performance impact. Yushi keiretsu is assessed as
membership of a main bank linkage and measured by dummies. Board size is
measured as the total number of directors on the board of each firm. The other
measure for boardroom changes includes the adaptation of the executive
officer system, computed as a binary variable. Because there is no accurate and
complete data available on executive salary, we could not employ that as an
independent variable in this study.2 The introduction of stock option
mechanisms is measured by dummies for each year.
Several control variables are introduced into the regression models.
Firm size is measured by the number of employees. Firm age is the
other firm-level control. Leverage is calculated as the percentage of long-term
debt to total assets. Strategic investments are computed as R&D intensity
(expenditures divided by total sales) and capital intensity (capital expenditures
divided by total assets). Average rate of annual growth of industry shipment in
3-digit JSIC sub-industries is employed using data from Kogyo Tokeihyo
(Manufacturing Census), published annually by the Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry (formerly the Ministry of International Trade and Industry).
Multiple regression analyses are used to examine the effectiveness of
corporate governance variables employed by Japanese electronic firms. Panel
data set is used for the analysis. The estimation technique employed is the
general least squares models. As Hausman tests indicated a significant
systematic difference in the coefficients from fixed effects models to random
effects models, we chose to use random effects models (White cross-section
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standard errors and covariance (d.f. corrected)) in our analysis. We
incorporated a 1-year lag between dependent and independent variables to
facilitate causality.
Statistical results
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients for the
variables. As the table shows, there were no significant correlations.
We report the results of the regression analysis in Table 6. Model 2 illustrates
the findings on foreign, executive and financial shareholdings. The outcomes
show that foreign ownership and financial ownership have positive and
significant effects on firm performance, while the impact of executive
ownership is insignificant. Hypotheses 1 and 3 are thus supported, while
Hypothesis 2 is rejected. Hypothesis 4 proposes that yushi keiretsu membership
is insignificantly linked to profitability. Model 3 supports that hypothesis.
Hypotheses 5 and 6, relating to boardroom reforms, predict that both the
reduction of board size and the presence of an executive officer system are
positively related to corporate performance. The results in Model 4 show that
board size has no significant effects, while executive officer system is negatively
related to profitability. Hypotheses 5 and 6 are thus both rejected. Hypothesis
7 proposes that the introduction of stock options will align shareholder and
management interests and thus have positive performance effects. Model 5
shows insignificant coefficient for stock options, and the hypothesis is rejected.
Discussion and Interpretation
The performance implications of various governance mechanisms that
Japanese electronics firms have introduced since the late 1990s have been
mixed, with some measures functioning positively as hypothesized, while others
did not lead to positive effects.
Share ownership by such performance-oriented entities as foreign investors
and certain financial institutions, especially trust banks, has exercised a
positive and significant influence, as expected. Yushi keiretsu shows no
significant impact, as we hypothesized. This provides additional evidence that
main bank monitoring has become less effective and conspicuous in recent
years. Interestingly, while board size did not affect financial performance, the
introduction of an executive officer system negatively influenced profitability.
This result challenges the conventional view that boardroom practices
modelled after the US system to separate decision-making and supervision
and implementation should have positive performance effects. One possible
reason for this is that the functional separation of directors and executive
officers has not yet been clearly implemented and many boards still had
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Table 5 Pearson correlation coefficients
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
ROA 1.000
Age 0.083 1.000
Employee 0.037 0.407 1.000
Leverage 0.214 0.214 0.230 1.000
Capital intensity 0.088 0.030 0.008 0.157 1.000
R&D intensity 0.009 0.144 0.048 0.038 0.036 1.000
Industry growth 0.064 0.152 0.100 0.068 0.015 0.017 1.000
Foreign ownership 0.019 0.165 0.245 0.231 0.062 0.087 0.054 1.000
Executive ownership 0.105 0.418 0.162 0.178 0.009 0.124 0.053 0.085 1.000
Financial ownership 0.023 0.238 0.253 0.025 0.043 0.147 0.021 0.176 0.255 1.000
Yushi keiretsu 0.067 0.406 0.176 0.340 0.030 0.006 0.076 0.186 0.332 0.043 1.000
Board size 0.052 0.264 0.409 0.223 0.026 0.057 0.009 0.004 0.269 0.232 0.198 1.000
Executive officer system 0.024 0.189 0.215 0.005 0.056 0.018 0.135 0.205 0.087 0.133 0.073 0.272 1.000
Stock option 0.086 0.023 0.214 0.044 0.080 0.182 0.058 0.256 0.023 0.064 0.106 0.034 0.258 1.000 A
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Table 6 GLS regression results on ROAa
Dependent variable: ROA
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Age 0.037 0.009 0.027 0.022 0.028 0.021
(0.032) (0.037) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.041)
Employee 2.29E–05 9.79E–05*2.35E–05 2.10E–05 3.40E–05 5.75E–05
(4.46E–05) (4.65E–05) (4.44E–05) (5.34E–05) (4.29E–05) (6.06E–05)
Leverage 1.379* 1.092* 1.295* 1.397* 1.364* 0.993*
(0.539) 0.491 (0.501) (0.546) (0.539) (0.445)
Capital intensity 0.329 0.320 0.329 0.333 0.326 0.321
(0.267) (0.268) (0.267) (0.262) (0.267) (0.264)
R&D intensity 0.220 0.317 0.223 0.239 0.213 0.360
(0.246) (0.261) (0.248) (0.254) (0.266) (0.286)
Industry growth 0.009 0.020 0.009 0.024 0.011 0.054
(0.105) (0.101) (0.105) (0.107) (0.107) (0.106)
Shareholder composition
Foreign ownership 0.114w 0.165*
(0.062) (0.067)
Executive ownership 0.110 0.008
(0.074) (0.112)
Financial ownership 0.106* 0.117*
(0.045) (0.046)
Main bank relationship
Yushi keiretsu 1.024 0.171
(1.270) (1.387)
Boardroom reforms
Board size 2.240 4.133
(2.952) (2.941)
Executive officer system 4.370w 7.134**
(2.380) (2.494)
Executive compensation
Stock option 0.981 1.402
(1.773) (1.767)
R2 0.091 0.106 0.092 0.096 0.091 0.120
Adj. R2 0.078 0.088 0.078 0.080 0.077 0.093
aUnstandardized coefficients are shown, with standard errors next to them (White
heteroskedasticity-consistent); n¼ 624.
wpo0.10; *po0.05; **po0.01.
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overlaps of monitoring and execution functions. As such, the combination of
smaller board size and executive officer system might have unexpectedly
sharpened, rather than resolved, the agency problem, because a small number
of inside executives now dominate decision-making. Further, executive
ownership and stock options have remained ineffective as mechanisms
to align the interests of senior executives and shareholders, as our test
illustrates.
The statistical results summarized above collectively deserve a coherent
interpretation. Compared to the predicted results in Table 4 we recognize one
consistent outcome. Overall, the hypotheses relating to external mechanisms of
corporate governance (Hypotheses 1, 3 and 4) are all supported, while those
regarding internal mechanisms (Hypotheses 2, 5, 6 and 7) are all rejected.
External pressures from market investors have apparently made senior
management more outcome-oriented — but managers utilized various
governance mechanisms, such as a smaller board, executive officer system,
and executive ownership and stock options, in a way that differs from the
original intention of interest alignment. This is because senior management did
not give away the long-established practice of internal control by following the
principle of newly institutionalized governance practices. Simply put, senior
management could and did ultimately achieve the goal of performance
improvements through strategic modifications without fundamentally reform-
ing governance mechanisms (Colpan et al., 2007).
These findings are, basically, consistent with institutional theory logic.
Generally, firms have an incentive to conform with and implement new
practices that are widely viewed as superior and legitimate. However, if the
perceived benefits of such new practices, such as greater economic benefits
and enhanced social legitimacy, remain unclear, senior management may
adopt such practices superficially and cosmetically, while actually decoupling
them from the original functional model (Oliver, 1991). Also, when there is
marked inconsistency between internal organizational logic and new
governance practices, then management has an incentive to avoid or decouple
such practices. After all, there are Japanese executives and shareholders
who remain sceptical about the US governance model, especially its
applicability in the Japanese context. For example, the top management of
both Toyota and Canon argue that outside directors with limited industry
knowledge bring little benefit. This is reflected in the fact that there is no
consensus among the key corporate governance constituents in Japan
regarding the future direction of corporate governance (Gilson and
Milhaupt, 2004). Further, the economic superiority of the US model of
corporate governance, based on monitoring by independent directors,
has not been empirically established even among US firms (cf. Johnson
et al., 1996; Dalton et al., 1998; Denis and McConnel, 2003). Therefore,
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it is not surprising that many Japanese firms only superficially implement
certain elements of US practices, presumably to appease capital market
pressures.
Conclusion
This paper has systematically investigated two critical issues regarding
the adaptation of governance reforms among Japanese firms: how far the
corporate governance of Japanese firms has actually transformed the
conventional system of alliance capitalism and managerial control; and what
have been the financial outcomes of governance reforms since the second half
of the 1990s. The conclusion of our study is that, despite all the changes, from
amendments to the Commercial Code and other legal and institutional
frameworks to the resulting changes in stock ownership, corporate control and
managerial organizations and practices, the influence of new ownership
composition and corporate governance mechanisms on financial performance
has been somewhat mixed.
One coherent picture that has emerged is an intriguing solution that
Japanese senior management have apparently found, which ultimately satisfies
the interest of market-based shareholders while allowing inside management to
hold on to their positions and power. This invention is the combination of
apparent governance reform and real modifications of strategic directions. The
managers keep their controlling power within their firms by decoupling the
principle and functioning of mechanisms of reformed governance, such as a
smaller board and an executive officer system. This is what institutional theory
predicts. The Japanese firm went one step further, though, when managers
actually improved the economic performance of their firms by modifying
strategic directions to appease market-oriented shareholders. Understandably,
as long as the financial returns of their shares grow, shareholders are little
concerned about the actual cause of such positive results.
Whether Japanese management has found unique solutions to enhance firm
performance within conventional governance practices is too early to judge. It
seems that there is still no clear consensus on the future direction of the
corporate governance system among Japanese firms and key stakeholders.
Hence, our findings validate the current transitional state of Japanese
corporate governance, where some firms are trying to adopt new practices in
form only, or with modifications to suit local and firm-specific contexts, which
may bring unintended performance consequences from what such practices
were originally designed for. However, it is also possible that new governance
measures in Japanese firms will evolve over time and begin to exhibit more
direct and substantive performance effects.
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Notes
1 While some studies found an inverted U-curve relationship between managerial ownership and
performance (Morck et al., 1988), it was not apparent in this sample. We run the regressions with
mean-centered executive ownership and its squared term, and the squared term was insignificant.
2 A close examination of the only readily available data on executive compensation in terms of
salary and bonus (that appears as an item among administrative and selling expenses in Nikkei
Needs, which includes not only executives’ salary, but also the provision for executives’ retirement
allowances and the executives’ bonus treated as administrative and selling expenses) shows that
that data are often incomplete and inaccurate.
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